Putting an end to terrorism in Indonesia - a success or failure?
In early 2016, an explosion shook the very core of the world’s most populous Muslim country. A Starbucks, one of the world’s most recognisable coffee chains, was rocked by a large explosion. Large grey clouds billowed into its adjacent buildings, followed by a bombing at a police patrol station by Jakarta’s busiest roundabout. Men in bullet proof vests threw grenades and fired into crowds that had gathered. Crowds full of civilians looked on in incredulity at a sight that had not terrorised Jakarta’s streets since 2009.
Before this, it seemed for a moment that Indonesia had achieved what was labelled a helpless ambition. They managed to dismantle an Al-Qaeda splinter cell, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) that had carried out bombings that claimed the lives of more than 250 lives in Indonesia from 2002 to 2009. Their bomb-making expert Azahari Bin Husin was killed in an operation by Indonesian police following a tip-off in 2005, followed by the killing of their recruiter, bomb maker and military-specialist Noordin Muhammad Top in a raid in 2009. A notable peace followed shortly after with no major terrorist attacks taking place on Indonesian soil, bringing an end to almost a decade of on-and-off bombings and assaults by JI. An impressive feat that could be attributed to the Indonesian government’s aggressive anti-terrorism efforts. Initially labelled helpless due to Indonesia’s almost complete lack of experience in anti-terrorism and political instability - many global leaders and analysts had no faith in Indonesia to halt the spread of JI’s power and influence.
The shock attack on Jakarta's central business district generated a discussion about whether or not Indonesia had really managed to put an end to terrorism or rather just ignored an insidious widespread dissatisfaction felt by many in Indonesia, a dissatisfaction that would consequently lead many in Indonesia to seek out extremist ideology as an answer to their problems. A possible crucial mistake made by the Indonesian government who had forsaken the needs and wants of those most vulnerable to radicalisation in exchange for weapons and brutality.
Counterterrorism does what it’s named. It seeks to prevent acts of terrorism. It stops acts of destruction and assault aimed to not only kill and maim many but acts doubly as psychological warfare. Indonesia has managed to develop one of Asia's most robust counterterrorism systems in the past 20 years on both financial and violent fronts. In 2013, the Indonesian parliament passed Law No. 9 of 2013 which was aimed at preventing the financing of terrorism by giving Indonesia's central government agency the ability to monitor any financial activity suspected of financing terror groups. It also placed a significant obligation on financial service providers such as banks to report any suspicious activity and a system of 'knowing your customers' with the inability to do so being a hefty penalty. Only recently in 2023 Indonesia joined the Financial Action Task Force, a inter-governmental body initiated by the G7 which aims to reduce terrorism funding which, in 2015, had moved Indonesia from their blacklist to grey-list. Following the Bali bombings and increasing pressure from Australia and the United States, Indonesia formulated a dedicated counter-terrorism unit named Densus 88. They proved to be extremely proficient, managing to arrest 466 JI members from 2002 to 2009 and were responsible for the killing of JI's leaders.
However the 2016 attacks and 2018 Surabaya bombings brought back an all too familiar fear - that Indonesia could slip back into another decade of terrorism, under a new banner and new name, under the Islamic State (ISIS). The international rise of ISIS reinvigorated Jihadist militants in Indonesia with many going to Syria to fight and train. Sidney Jones, the director for the Institute for Policy Analysis in Conflict, said that the conflict in Syria had “captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a way no foreign war has before.” An estimated 50 Indonesians travelled to Syria in 2012. While the number of travellers may seem negligible, the institute expressed their concerns that ISIS and extremist ideology may undermine Indonesia's already fragile religious harmony and that domestic terrorist groups might begin to grow in power once again.
The rise of ISIS exposed a glaring problem, that counter-terrorism is a fruitless effort if it only targeted known terrorists by arming elite military-specialists and soldiers or by increasing surveillance. Counterinsurgency needed to be a greater priority for the Indonesian government. Focusing on the people most vulnerable to being radicalised is not unproductive but rather it nips at the sprouts of terrorism and prevents it from spreading. JI recruited new members by infiltrating religious institutions and through dakwah (the act of inviting people into Islam) in marginalised and conservative communities. Something as innocent and righteous as attending Friday prayer had been tainted by terrorist groups looking to spread their radical doctrine, with the most vulnerable being poor young men. This was also compounded by Indonesia's widespread poverty, with the World Bank reporting that 9.5% of Indonesia's population still live below the poverty line in 2022. Studies have repeatedly shown that poorer people are more prone to religious radicalisation usually due to a 'less to lose' mindset, lower levels of formal education and poor employment prospects.
So far the Indonesian government has no widely funded anti-insurgency programs or efforts. Instead many are led by NGOs or independent agencies. Notably, Max Boon, a Dutch-national who lost both his legs in the 2009 Marriott bombings in Jakarta returned to the city following intensive surgery and rehabilitation with the goal of helping those most vulnerable to turn away from terrorism. In a speech at the UN and several interviews, he did not vilify sympathisers nor the young Javan terrorist who maimed him that fateful morning at the Marriott. Alternatively, he offered understanding and education to the families of terrorists as well as certain Tahfiz schools (a form of Islamic religious school) known to breed militants. He believed in restoring humanity into the targets of terrorists by allowing these individuals to put a face to the very people they believed in hurting. Other programs also provide disadvantaged young men with better employment prospects. If these efforts were to multiply, the very insecurities that terrorists exploit would cease to exist.
Indonesia may have flexed their counterterrorism 'muscles’, but she falls short on psychological, emotional and subjective levels. The cornerstones to a greatly important pursuit are missing - is Indonesia to face a potential breakdown of their counterterrorism efforts? What if a new emergent extremist force lurks beneath?
We can only wait and see.
